Militia focus and mission


The U.S. Constitution calls for the militia to “execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;”   The reality is, at the moment, there is low likelihood of needing to repel an invasion.   I also don’t expect many state or local governments to call up unorganized militias to “execute the laws of the Union” due to public perception and municipal liability.   

That leaves “suppress insurrections”, and oppose tyranny when it comes in the form of government.   Indeed, we have seen militias do just that.

Bundy ranch: Militia members stood up to federal overreach trying to seize the Bundys cattle.
Battle of Athens Tennessee: locals took up arms to stop the local government from predatory policing, police brutality, political corruption, and voter intimidation.

George Floyd riots: Small groups assisted local business owners in protecting their private property when the local police were overwhelmed

Gettysburg threats:   Hundreds showed up to protect the park against antifa attacks

Military recruiter attacks: After several army recruiter offices were attacked, militia groups stood guard outside, showing support.

In spite of this, it seems most militia groups I have seen, seem to be focused on survival/prepping or preparing to repel a foreign invasion.   I think this lack of focus and mission very much is to the detriment of the movement as a whole.   When a new member joins a group, wanting to contribute, and the group has a class on fishing fly tying, and jungle booby traps, they start to loose interest… And I don’t think it is the intent of those group leaders, just the fact that their is lack of focus and mission.

When asked, most will say the mission of their unit is “to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;…”   But that is still pretty vague.   
Take the U.S. Army:   Their mission is ” To deploy, fight, and win our Nation’s wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the Joint Force.”, but each unit has it’s own mission within the big picture.   For instance, the air defense artillery mission is: “to protect the force and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance.”   That is pretty specific… it allows a unit to develop its Mission Essential Task List (METL) and come up with a training program that supports that specific mission.

So should the unit mission of a militia be “to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to destroy, capture, or repel an assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.”?   How will that fit in the framework of suppressing insurrection?   Defending a store or monument or cattle ranch?   I do think the fundamentals of infantry are essential for modern militias.    It takes a lot of training evolutions to get proficient at it.   Given that most groups meet once a month, for a full Saturday and a few hours on Sunday, leaves  about 18 days of training.    (12 full days and 12 half days).    Eighteen days to get proficient at manipulating weapons,  react to contact, communicate, casevac, TCCC, land nav,  assault, patrol, post contact actions, etc… Plus if you are defending property during civil unrest, you’ll need some legal guidance on use of force, and options,  citizens arrest (if aplicable in your state) etc, so your group doesn’t get jammed up after the fact.   That’s a lot to get proficient in, in just 18 days.   

That is the focus I see missing.   No group is going to be proficient at basic infantry if they are also training in foraging, food preservation, etc, they will be jacks of all trades and masters of none.

And that brings us to the crux of the issue.   Leadership.    Not necessarily that leaders are bad, but many don’t have good direction (or focus)… because supporting and defending the constitution against all enemies is noble, it is just too general of a mission, and the local leaders don’t have the guidance to focus on more unit oriented missions and training.    Additionally, because a lot of the volunteers mainly want to “play army in the woods” there is a lack of support leadership…Intel, comms, public relations, and logistics.   That requires a time commitment beyond the monthly FTX, and recruiting for it is a long pole in the tent, because it is not as “fun” or “glamorous” as playing army in the woods.

Ideas for solutions?
Do we start a militia “officers corps” (even though most are not commissioned)?

Maybe a dual organizational structure like the Sinn Féin and the IRA?

Is political and social activism going to be part of the militia, or just something on members do on their own?

What are your ideas?

Burner Phones

Nextel Cell Phone

While a staple of modern thriller and spy movies, burn phones are a “work around” to the SIGINT threats that cell phones pose against advanced and professional capable threats.

The concept is simple. Use burn phones between members that can not be tied to those people if analysis is performed.

The execution is hardly simple.

Most burn phones are “pay as you go” meaning there is a phone card, or the phone gets “topped up” on usage minutes so no checking or credit card account has to be used. Many pay as you go phones need a one time credit card payment to activate the account or top up, so a pre-paid Visa gift card or something similar is the tool of choice.

Because prepaid phones and gift cards are often sold at stores that record surveillance footage, so care must be taken when acquiring them. Also, if one phone becomes flagged other phones from that same store, or gift cards from the same store will also be watched, so best practice is to get a prepaid gift card from one store, Wait several weeks, then get a phone from another store.

Remember proximity analysis! If your “normal” cell phone was in close proximity to where either the burn phone, or the gift card were bought, it will be scrutinized more. Likewise, if a burn phone was ever in close proximity to your home, work, or any place you frequent, you will receive more scrutiny.

Remember link analysis! If you use the burn phone to call home, or friends or co-workers, or team mates, they will all be looked at more closely. A burn phone should only be used to call other burn phones, or call decoy numbers that can not be associated with you.

Remember pattern analysis! Your “normal” phone needs an alibi, or to be in its normal pattern. While inconvenient, start leaving your “normal” phone at home one day a week, or on weekends, etc, this creates patterns, that once established, are less likely to raise red flags.

I’m not dead yet!

I haven’t had much time lately to put into Vol 2 of the signals handbook, and this site.


Once I finish moving to the house in the country, and with my new work schedule, I hope to be back into the thick of things soon.

Stay tuned!


Satellites and SIGINT

From the blog:

Full article here:


Signal intelligence 101: SIGINT targets

In order to start a series of articles about the American signal intelligence satellites, written with guest author Rob1, I thought it could be interesting to give some background on what those satellites listen to. So here is a quick overview of the various types of signal intelligence targets, with an emphasis on the Cold War period.

Historical Context

The discovery of radio waves revolutionized communications. Instead of having to transport messages by horse, train or plane, and instead of having to build long telegraph lines, it became possible to transmit information instantaneously between two points without any infrastructure in-between.

The advantage was obvious, especially for military applications. Remote outposts, ships at sea, and planes, could easily receive their orders and report their status. Conversely, being able to intercept those communications became equally critical. During World War II for instance, the Allied forces put a lot of resources in intercepting and decrypting German and Japanese communications. After the war, the political situation changed, and for the Americans the USSR became the focus of their intelligence effort. The closed nature of the Soviet government and society made it a tough target to crack. US diplomatic presence, and US spies in the Eastern bloc, brought some light on the Soviet activities, but much of it remained inaccessible.

To gather more information, the US turned to signals intelligence (SIGINT) – the collection and analysis of electronic emissions – in order to answer the most pressing political and military questions. Because SIGINT relies on collecting signals from targets, different questions will result in collection against different targets. A few of those targets are listed below, with a bias towards installations targeted by the USA in the Soviet Union.

Read the rest of the article at it’s source:

Mobilization Indicators for the Homegrown Violent Extremist

A new doc for the intel library from the National Counter-terrorism Center.

This handbook lists what to look for (indicators) that may foreshadow a violent terrorist action.

An Excerpt:

The indicators of violent extremist mobilization described herein are intended to
provide federal, state, local, territorial and tribal law enforcement a roadmap of observable
behaviors that could inform whether individuals or groups are preparing to engage in
violent extremist activities including potential travel overseas to join a Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO). The indicators are grouped by their assessed levels of diagnosticity—
meaning how clearly we judge the behavior demonstrates an individual’s trajectory towards
terrorist activity. The list also includes additional information concerning what the behavior
could indicate, identifies likely observers, and provides a probable timeframe between
behavior and an ultimate violent act. Some of these activities might be constitutionally
protected and may be insignificant on their own, but, when observed in combination
with other suspicious behaviors, may constitute a basis for reporting. Law enforcement
(LE) action should not be taken based solely on the exercise of constitutionally protected
activities or on the apparent race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion of the subject.

New communications book for the library

The “Multinational Capability Development Campaign” is a follow-on to the Multinational Experiment (MNE) series initiated by United States Joint Forces Command in 2001. It is designed to develop and introduce new capabilities to enhance the coalition force’s operational effectiveness in joint, interagency, multinational, and coalition operations. While it maintains the foundational blocks that made the MNE series successful, MCDC incorporates significant changes in scope, mission, and governance that improve responsiveness, agility, and relevance. 

Their handbook :”Military Strategic Communications in Coalition Operations” gives insight into strategic communications at the Joint Taskforce level.    While the material is a bit bureaucratic for the small team, the information in it is useful for understanding communications organizations at the high level.

From the handbook:

This handbook is intended for use by commanders and their staff at the operational Joint Task Force
(JTF) level, but could be used at any level as a reference. The purpose of the publication is to describe
the fundamental operational aspects of Strategic Communication (StratCom) in the military, and
propose guidance for the implementation of StratCom in support of a deployed JTF.
The primary audience of this handbook comprises the JTF Command Group and HQ Special Staff; the
members of the StratCom staff element(s); the Intelligence staff; the Operations staff; the Plans staff;
the Information Operations (Info Ops) staff and Public Affairs Officers (PAOs) at all levels.
Additional audiences include: personnel involved in the UN Integrated Missions Planning Process or
similar processes at the inter-governmental or strategic-political level; decision-makers, planners and
analysts at the military-strategic level; the operational-level Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) staff;
staff members involved in liaison and Joint Military Commission (JMC) activities; and related staff and
commanders at the Component Command (CC) level.
Chapter 7 – Military Strategic Communication in a Nutshell – is intended to provide a concise first
overview of the subject for anyone not (yet) familiar with or not directly involved in the execution of
StratCom tasks.2
It should also be read by the StratCom staff to derive incentives for discussions with,
and education and training of non-StratCom personnel, as required.

Updated version of DRYAD generator

A “Bombe” early computer, used to break the German Enigma code

After I released the DRYAD generator, I received  few reports that it would generate the same output every time.    This is not good, even for training.   Work, family, and life put my programming efforts on the back burner for a while.   When I finally got back to it, I discovered that I committed an amateur programming mistake. 

I forgot to seed the random generator

Computers are “deterministic” machines.   That means that every action has a predictable action, or that the actions are “determined” by the programming.   That is a good thing because computers would not be very useful if their output changed at random.   However for generating cryptographic materials you need good randomness.   In order to create the appearance of randomness computers use a “Pseudo Random Number Generator” (PRNG).   A PRNG basically takes a number as input called the “seed”, and then runs it through a complicated series of mathematical equations that gives you a result that seems random, with no correlation to the input seed.   For example, a seed of “1” might yield a result of “72542” while a seed of “2” might result in “17”.

My DRYAD bug

I forgot to add a line defining a seed, so most likely it would default to “0”
resulting in the same DRYAD page being generated every time the program was run.

The Seed is the key

In order to get pseudo randomness that does not repeat, many programming classes teach using a value of time as the random seed.   Computers keep time by counting the number of seconds since some predetermined date/time reference (called an “epoch”)
Since real time does not repeat I.E. it will only be 12:01 PM on January the 1st, 2017 once, using it as a seed guarantees that our seed is never repeated.   
This is what I have added to the 1.01 version of the DRYAD generator.
Link HERE!

While it is pseudo random, it is still not good enough

While this is unpredictable enough for video games and entertainment, it sucks for real cryptography.   For a single line on a DRYAD sheet, there are 403,291,461,126,605,635,584,000,000 possible combinations.   That is over 403 Septillion combinations.   However there are only just over 35 million seconds in a year.   If you know the formula a given crypto uses, and you know it uses “time” as the seed, then you can run the formula and simply increment the seed, starting at the earliest possible time the computer was used.   A modern computer can test years of “time” based seed in a few minutes, leaving a searchable database of every possible DRYAD sheet that could be generated in a given year.   Not very secure by a determined adversary.

This is why the current version of the DRYAD generator should be limited to training purposes ONLY!

I hope to have an improved version later that will solve the “seed” problem.
An ideal crypto-secure seed would come from a very large unpredictable source.   Government grade high level crypto use special devices that use an “entropy” source.
“Entropy” is defined as “lack of order or predictability.”  

Imagine a very sensitive thermometer that can accurately read to 1/1000 of a degree.   If that thermometer is in a computer case, it will measure the fluctuations of temperature inside.      The temperature is affected by ambient room temperature, how hard the CPU and graphics cards are running, fan speed, etc.   The temperature can fluctuate by as much as twenty degrees.   twenty degrees doesn’t sound like a lot, a fluctuation between 100.0001 and 100.9999 degrees overs a much larger range of unpredictability. 

Government certified entropy devices have been designed AND tested to insure that they are truly entropic (unpredictable) and evenly distributed. (if they generate a number between 1 and 10, a sample of a million tests should have roughly equal quantities of each value.)   

Because of the value of entropic seeds in generating random numbers for cryptography, most modern computer operating systems now have “entropy pools” to be used in seeding PRNGs.   These entropy pools combine mouse movements, keyboard timings, temperatures, hard drive seek times, and other unpredictable sources to populate the pool.

The next version of the DRYAD generator

I hope to include strong entropy and a better PRNG for the next version of the DRYAD generator.   After that, I hope to add a GUI.   I won’t put a timeframe on it, because if I do, life will guarantee that I won’t make the deadline.

P.S.   The big numbers:

The number of possible combinations on a single DRYAD line:
aka 403.29 Septillion

The number of possible combinations for a full DRYAD sheet:
I can not count that high.   

Number of seconds in a year: (and possible time based random seeds for a given year)
aka 31.54 Million

Estimated age of the universe:
13.82 Billion years old
Number of Seconds in the universe so far:
About 484,000,000,000,000,000
aka 484 Quadrillion
aka orders of magnitude fewer seconds in the history of the universe, than possible combinations for a single line of a DRYAD sheet!

New HF Direction finding methods from Isreal

The new ELK 7065 from IAI:

From the link:

The ELK-7065 is a state-of-the-art HF COMINT system suitable for the harsh electromagnetic environment characterizing the HF band. The system tags and identifies signals characteristics in a multi-dimensional domain, composed of signal identifiers such as power, center frequency, modulation, geo-location, polarization and more. These techniques enable swift labeling of the received signals, identification and reliable Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) generation. The unique front-end technology allows installation on board compact airborne platforms, such as mission aircraft of all sizes and UAVs.

More info HERE!


And last but not least, a Youtube video:


The Role of Intelligence in Small Tactical Teams


What is Intelligence

Intelligence, in the context of this discussion, is the act of reducing uncertainty. For militias, neighborhood protection teams, mutual assistance groups and other small groups, intelligence is crucial in economy of effort.

“Economy of effort” is essentially “getting the most bang for your buck.”
Imagine the mission of: “Protect your home from looters after the storm”. Without any information, you don’t know where to focus observation, what to plan for, etc…. As we develop intelligence, we can reduce uncertainty, and better defend your home. If you know that the most likely looters will be young disenfranchised Swedish immigrants from the housing projects north of your neighborhood, you can be aware of what to look for. If you know the terrain of your area, then you can determine that the Swedish looters will come from one or two avenues of approach. This allows you to focus your observation there. Etc…


While in “peacetime” or “DEFCON 4”, or “condition blue”, or whatever the operative term for “No immediate operations or threats,” there are a number of intelligence functions that should be carried out to be prepared for operations.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

One of the first tasks an intelligence section should carry out is Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (or IPB)
In IPB, you determine the area of operations (AO), area of interest (AI), Map terrain features and determine lanes of movement, and avenues of approach. Where are obstacles, etc…

Sam Culper has an Amazon ebook (more like a pamphlet) on Amazon, called “intelligence preparation of the battlefield”, as well as his book “SHTF Intelligence” and website that goes into much more depth.

There is also the army field manual 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.

Other tasks that go with the IPB phase include defining the human terrain(Demographics, and where are people based on culture, economics, politics, etc), mapping infrastructure such as rail lines, power lines, gas lines, substations, pumping stations, water treatment, etc, and if your group has a capable signals section, mapping radio users, towers, frequencies, modes, etc.

Intelligence Database

In addition to IPB, your intelligence section should be developing an intelligence database.

In times past, filing cabinets, folders and index cards were the tool of choice. These days the most popular setup is a “wiki” type database. (Wikipedia is the most well known wiki) In fact, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security uses a “wiki” database called “Intelliwiki” as their national set-up. Regardless of what format you use, you should be collecting information on influences in your AO.

Categories of influences are people, groups, gangs, organizations, companies, etc… Gaining thorough information on these influences helps to reduce uncertainty.

For example, knowing that Ludvig Karlsson is the leader of the local Swedish criminal gang, means that an intelligence section can keep tabs on him, to get an idea of gang activities, instead of trying to watch the whole gang. (An example of “economy of effort”)

Operational Planning

Peacetime has ended, or you have gone to” DEFCON 3”, or “Condition Orange”, or whatever your group determines to be a heightened state of readiness. This elevation of readiness does not happen in a vacuum, it happens in response to something, and that “something” should help to define your intelligence requirements. Your group is going operational. At this point the intelligence section will start doing analysis, and in conjunction with leadership, determine priority intelligence requirements, (PIR’s), data gaps that need to be filled, developing human intelligence resources (aka spies and moles) within groups that you may have interest in, etc…

The who and what of this planning it this stage will be very dependent on your groups function and goals. A neighborhood protection team will be more interested in criminal gangs, and food supply, while a guerrilla/insurgent group will be more concerned with political groups and influences.


Analysis is the process of taking known information about situations and entities of strategic, operational, or tactical importance, characterizing the known, and, with appropriate statements of probability, the future actions in those situations and by those entities.

An excellent book to get started in understanding analysis is: Intelligence Analysis, a Target-Centric Approach

Whole college courses are taught on analysis, and this discussion can not possibly cover all the information needed just to get started.

To briefly encapsulate the analysis process, what is known, and what is reported is evaluated to rate the reliability of the data, then that information is modeled, with the different possible outcomes of actions. Most likely course of action and most dangerous course of action are considered. “Wargaming” and “Red Teaming” may be used to play out COA’s,


Once your group is actually conducting a mission, or operational, the duties of the intelligence section get added to. The most common responsibilities include tracking friendly forces, enemy forces, other groups, weather, looking for trigger events, and any changes in the assumptions that were made in the analysis and planning phase, and advising leadership on any changes in expected COA’s. Just because you are operational does not mean the planning, and pre-planning stop. In fact it is when things are most fluid that keeping IPB’s, Intel DB’s, and models up to date can be the biggest help.

Putting it all together

Example 1: Neighborhood Protection Team

Background. Due to some un-named catastrophe, there is a break down in the rule of law. Government is non-functional, and your group is tasked with protecting the neighborhood from looters. You have done IPB, and built an intelligence database.

Defense of your location is the mission, so you develop some of the following PIR’s

Who are the most likely threats, and what are their capabilities and methods?

What is an indicator that a threat is imminent?

Because you have developed your intelligence database, you know that there are two criminal gangs that were functional during peacetime in your area.
The Swedish gang is the biggest, and their leader, Ludvig Karlsson drives a tricked out red Volvo SUV.
There is also a latino gang ran by someone called “El Hefe”. Many gang members have low-rider cars and compact pickups.

Because you have done a proper IPB, you know that there is only vehicle access to your neighborhood via 2 roads from the north. Travel on foot from the west is unlikely due to the swampy marsh on that side, and thick woods followed by another neighborhood to the south means that threat to you from that direction is unlikely without the southern neighborhood being attacked first. This knowledge allows to more economically marshal your resources to guard the two roads, and the exposed fields on the east. (This economy of effort, and you don’t totally discount the south and west, but you can devote significantly fewer resources to guarding them.)

A week into the catastrophe, you get a reliable report that a neighborhood 12 miles to the north of you was wiped out. The attackers are reported to have been Caucasian, and many were blond. A red tricked out Volvo SUV was seen. There were about 30 attackers. And they attacked around noon. They raped and looted, and killed everyone that was in the neighborhood, and then set it on fire.

A few days later a reliable report indicates that another neighborhood was attacked at night by about a dozen Hispanic looking men. They only looted, but did not hesitate to kill any who resisted. A low-rider pickup truck was cruising the area that afternoon.

A few days later, there is another report of a daylight raid and red Volvo SUV on one neighborhood that was burnt to the ground, and a night time raid by a Latino gang that happened after a low-rider pickup was seen in the area.

At this point we can “model” the behavior of the two gangs, and say that the most likely course of action by the Latino gang will involve a scout in a low rider pickup, and attack at night, while an attack by the Swedish gang will include a red Volvo SUV during the day.

We then determine that the most dangerous course of action (for us) is to be attacked by the Swedish gang, since they spare none, and burn everything to the ground. Being attacked by the Latino gang is also a dangerous course of action.

Knowing this we have a number of courses of action to consider, in order to make our plans.

Since you know that El Hefe is the leader of the Latino gang, you could specifically target him at his home (If you know where that is), but what will the gang do then? Will they escalate their violence? Is there a second in command that will step up and carry out the same raids? Or will they fall apart?
It is okay to say “I don’t know.” In fact it is preferred. Guessing or making stuff up is a recipe for disaster. A proper analysis needs the facts and data weighted correctly to be useful.

Not knowing what will happen to the Latino gang if El Hefe is taken out leads leadership to conclude it is not worth the risk of sending people out of the protection of the neighborhood to make the hit. Instead, they conclude that an advanced observation post (OP) to watch for low-riders, and red Volvos is a better risk/reward.

Several weeks in, your OP radios in that a tricked out red Volvo SUV, followed by about nine other cars just passed the OP en route to your neighborhood, about six miles away. You sound the alarm, and your neighborhood protection team moves to a prepared ambush site one mile north of the neighborhood. When the Volvo convoy gets into the killzone, the ambush is executed.

After most of the convoy is wiped out, you find Ludvig Karlsson and some other Swedish gang members among the dead and injured, along with a number of weapons, molotov cocktails, and forced entry tools. Mission success (for now)

Even with the one threat eliminated, the Intel team cannot stand down. Will the Latino gang attack? Will another group move in, or fill the void left by the Swedish gang? Will any survivors of the Swedish gang try to retaliate? (Will they even know who wiped them out, since the ambush was away from the neighborhood?) These are all issues the intelligence section must continue to work on.

Now imagine if the neighborhood protection team did not have an intelligence section or person?
The first hint of a raid would be when the raid happens. Most likely the neighborhood would have more casualties. They would not have the advantage of a well planned ambush, or early warning. Vehicles and houses would be damaged by the firefight. If molotovs are thrown, some houses may burn. If the defenders do not completely wipe out the Swedish gang, and they are driven back, they may come back for retribution. All a much more dangerous course of action.

Example 2: Intel in political action

Background: Your group is a state gun rights group trying to influence social and political action to remove current state firearms restrictions.

Your IPB will not focus on physical terrain, lanes of movement and avenues of approach, but instead focus on the human terrain. Where are the conservative and liberal neighborhoods? What areas of employment tend to have one political stripe work there? (For instance more liberals will work in the trendy hipster coffee shop section of town, while more conservative minded folks will be working in the industrial business park. ) Why does this matter? If you spend money on political advertising such as a billboard, putting one that resonates with conservatives in a conservative part of town is more effective than putting a conservative billboard in a liberal part of town.

Your database will have the politicians, their donors, businesses, and donor businesses. Other political activist groups (Both for and against), etc… This is used to leverage campaigns against the opponents donors and sponsors. A boycott of a gun grabbers major donor, may hurt their bottom line, and reduce their effectiveness.

Your analysis will focus on which groups to pressure, or what areas to market to will yield the biggest effect for political action. (Economy of effort again)

Example 3: Guerrilla / Insurgency

Background: You live in Dirka Dirka-stan, and due to the fact that the political establishment is so entrenched and in bed with big business, your attempts to peacefully effect the political process have failed, so your group decides to go kinetic.

Understanding the human terrain is essential!

There is a senator from Dirkafornia that is notoriously anti-rights and anti-gun. A lot of insurgents, if given the chance, would jump at the opportunity to kinetically remove the senator. However, if your intelligence section has done its homework, they may conclude that since the senator is from the city of Dirkfrancisco, that their likely successor will be just as bad as a gun grabber as the target. Additionally, we can model that after many political assassinations, there is a groundswell of sympathetic support for the deceased’s pet causes… so a kinetic action against the senator may actually produce the opposite of the desired effect, and get sympathy votes of “We should ban more guns, because that is what the senator would have wanted, in honor of them.”

Individual guerrilla actions may require an IPB for a specific action, such as an ambush or assasination.
Analysis is needed to look at the courses of action for success and failures of the mission so that the risks can be weighed. What are the third and fourth order effects? Will there be blowback? By whom? What will the public reaction be?


Intelligence is an important task for small tactical teams. It can mean the difference between success or failure. It can prevent the waste of life and resources. It drives the missions!

In an Army Infantry Brigade there is an intelligence company of about 60 people devoted to the task, which include network and computer technicians, Human Intelligence collectors, Signals Intelligence collectors, exploitation teams, analysts, synchronization and collection management sections, linguists, cryptanalysts, imagery analysts, database technicians, and more.
Additionally this company supports intelligence sections at brigade and battalion level.

This is a huge role to fill by one or couple of people that will make a small teams intelligence section. While you can not do everything a brigade intel company does, starting with the basics gets you a huge advantage over the unprepared.

For more links check the S2 section here: S2 library